In order to do good, you may have to engage in evil.


Robert McNamara came to the position of Secretary of Defense from Ford Motor Company. He was considered the prize of the Kennedy cabinet – one of the smartest guys in Washington.

Many high ranking military officers were promoting the idea of massive bombing in North Vietnam and, at the time, President Johnson wasn't ready to take that step.  McNamara was one of the loudest voices among them and he was looking for a way to bring this about.  There had been a minor incident in the Gulf of Tonkin, but nothing to justify this action.  Two days later, on August 4, 1964 there were early reports of navel vessels under attack in the gulf.  McNamara immediately phoned Johnson with the news and the process was set in motion to go to congress for authorization for further intervention.  A few hours later reports began to arrive that the initial reports were the misinterpretations of radar and other actions.  This word stayed with McNamara who let the process go through and the US became firmly entrenched in southeast Asis.

Once involved, he rejected the massive retaliation strategy that served the Truman and Eisenhower administrations well. In Vietnam he developed the process of counterinsurgency – winning the hearts and minds of the people through propaganda, assassinations and surprise attacks.

As the war became a war of attrition – succeeding by killing more Vietnamese than they killed of American boys – they needed more and more soldiers to carry on the battle. Falling back on his glory days as one of the whiz kids who built Ford after World War II, he thought that anyone could learn pretty much anything by watching films.

The recruiting standards were lowered in an effort to meet the growing numbers needed and they got to the point of bringing in young men who came to be known as “McNamara's morons”. They watched but didn't learn. They became more of a hazard to themselves and their fellow soldiers than to the enemy. Many were delivered to their families in flag draped coffins without producing any positive effect on the war. They were just a few more of the fifty eight thousand names on the wall in DC.

Many commanders of the victorious World War II era objected but were overruled. He was waging a war against a ruthless enemy like he would deal with union leaders trying squeeze some more money out of the corporate treasury. This is also the way he dealt with the Soviet Union. Instead of having the ability to obliterate the enemy, his cost/benefit analysis believed a less expensive policy of mutually assured destruction, or MAD as it came to be known, would be just as effective.

McNamara came into office with idealistic “New Frontier” enthusiasm, but even he had to yield on defense contracts, handing the job of producing a new fighter jet to Lyndon Johnson crony General Dynamics rather then the expected Boeing.

Toward the late 60's Robert McNamara saw things were not going well in southeast Asia. Counterinsurgency was not working. The administration believed they could do a job and then come home. Their adversary was fighting for their homes – even communist homes against the intruders. They were never going to surrender.

In 1969 a group of historians gathered to evaluate the lessons learned in Vietnam. Future general, Paul Gorman summed it up in one word: “Don't”.

The Pennsylvania Dutch have a saying: Why is it we get so soon old and so late smart.

In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam
by Robert S. McNamara

The Secretary of Defense for the Kennedy and Johnson administrations provides a perceptive and candid account of how--and why--America became involved in Vietnam, discussing his own activities and the legacy of decisions made during the 1960s.

Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam
by H. R. McMaster

"The war in Vietnam was not lost in the field, nor was it lost on the front pages of the New York Times or the college campuses. It was lost in Washington, D.C."  —H. R. McMaster (from the Conclusion)

Dereliction Of Duty is a stunning analysis of how and why the United States became involved in an all-out and disastrous war in Southeast Asia. Fully and convincingly researched, based on transcripts and personal accounts of crucial meetings, confrontations and decisions, it is the only book that fully re-creates what happened and why. McMaster pinpoints the policies and decisions that got the United States into the morass and reveals who made these decisions and the motives behind them, disproving the published theories of other historians and excuses of the participants.

A page-turning narrative, Dereliction Of Duty focuses on a fascinating cast of characters: President Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, General Maxwell Taylor, McGeorge Bundy and other top aides who deliberately deceived the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U.S. Congress and the American public.

McMaster’s only book, Dereliction of Duty is an explosive and authoritative new look at the controversy concerning the United States involvement in Vietnam.

The Fog of War: Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara
by James G. Blight, Janet M. Lang


Robert S. McNamara is one of modern America's most controversial figures. His opinions, policies, and actions have led to a firestorm of debate, ignited most recently by Errol Morris's Academy Award-winning film, The Fog of War.

In the companion book, editors James G. Blight and janet M. Lang use lessons from McNamara's life to examine issues of war and peace in the 20th century. McNamara's career spans some of America's defining events―from the end of World War I, through the course of World War II, and the unfolding of the Cold War in Cuba, Vietnam, and around the world. The Fog of War brings together film transcripts, documents, dialogues, and essays to explore what the horrors and triumphs of the 20th century can teach us about the future.